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ABSTRACT
Millimeter-wavewireless networks offer high throughput and
can (ideally) prevent eavesdropping attacks using narrow,
directional beams. Unfortunately, imperfections in physi-
cal hardware mean today’s antenna arrays all exhibit side
lobes, signals that carry the same sensitive data as the main
lobe. Our work presents results of the first experimental
study of the security properties of mmWave transmissions
against side-lobe eavesdropping attacks. We show that these
attacks on mmWave links are highly effective in both indoor
and outdoor settings, and they cannot be eliminated by im-
proved hardware or currently proposed defenses.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication has always been more vulnera-
ble to attacks than its wired counterparts. The fact that wire-
less signals are broadcast means they are more easily eaves-
dropped. This weakness has been exploited in many wire-
less networks [33, 34, 36]. Even more recent security pro-
tocols like WPA2-PSK have been successfully compromised
by snooping attacks [11, 30] via simple tools [2]. Despite
existing encryptions, one can still infer the specific sources
of traffic by observing just packet sizes and counts in data
transmissions [17, 28].
While we continue to improve encryption algorithms, an
equally promising direction is to use wireless beamform-
ing to defend against eavesdroppers at the physical layer.
Beamforming allows a transmitter (TX) to send a highly fo-
cused, directional signal towards a target receiver (RX), so
that nearby attackers not directly between the two endpoints
cannot capture the transmission. The narrow beam is built by
leveraging signal cancellations among multiple antennas in
a phased array1, and is most easily built on millimeter-wave
(mmWave) transmitters [1]. For example, 60GHz phased ar-
rays could fit on small devices like smartphones, and can
generate highly focused beams (e.g., 3◦ using 32×32 anten-
nas) while achieving Gbps throughput.
While earlier applications focused on short-range indoor
applications, e.g., home routers [8] and wireless virtual real-
ity headsets [10], new applications of mmWave leverage its
high directionality and throughput for long-range communi-
1 We do not consider horn antennas as they are bulky, expensive,
and can only be rotated mechanically. They are not suitable for our
application scenarios.
cation. Many such applications have already been deployed.
Facebook has deployed a mesh network using 60GHz com-
munications in downtown San Jose [7]. Google is consider-
ing replacing wired fiber with mmWave to reduce cost [5].
Academics have proposed picocell networks using mmWave
signals towards next 5G network [29, 32, 42].
With a growing number of deployed networks and ap-
plications, understanding physical properties of mmWave is
critical. One under-studied aspect of directional transmis-
sions is the artifact of array side lobes. Fig. 1 shows an ex-
ample of the series of side lobes pointing in different direc-
tions. Side lobes are results of imperfect signal cancellation
among antenna elements. While weaker than the main lobe,
side lobes carry the same information, and can be exploited
by eavesdroppers to recover the transmission. As physical
imperfections, they are very difficult to eliminate.
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical study of the se-
curity properties of mmWave communications against side-
lobe eavesdropping attacks. While theoretical studies have
shown the problem of side-lobe leakage [25], it is never vali-
dated using networkmeasurements, especially for long-range
communications. We use a commercial 60GHz testbed from
Facebook’s Terragraph project [4] to evaluate the effective-
ness of side-lobe eavesdropping in both indoor and outdoor
scenarios. Specifically, we answer three key questions:
• How severe is mmWave side-lobe eavesdropping? (§3)
We observe that side-lobe eavesdropping is incredibly ef-
fective in both indoor and outdoor scenarios. Attacker can
recover transmission in a large area with high success rate
(details below). Particularly for outdoor scenarios, most
eavesdropping areas are connected, and the attacker can
move freely and launch stealthy attacks.
Eavesdropping Area (m2)
Attacker’s Packet Success Rate
>10% >50% >95%
Mesh 79 64.6 55
Picocell 109 88.6 54
Peer-to-Peer 16.6 15.7 13.1
• Can better mmWave hardware improve security? (§4)
We find that improved hardware can only reduce the im-
pact of the eavesdropping attack, but not fully defend against
it. Eavesdropping side lobes is still possible even after re-
moving hardware artifacts from antennas and deploying
more antenna elements.
• Are existing defenses effective against side-lobe eaves-
drop attacks? (§5) Although existing defenses show
1
promising results against single-device eavesdroppers, they
either impose impractical hardware requirements, or re-
main vulnerable against more advanced attackers, e.g., those
with multiple devices.
2. BACKGROUND
To provide context for later study, we first describe the
adversarial model and then our measurement methodology.
Adversarial Model. We consider passive eavesdropping,
where an attacker listens to side-lobe signals and recovers
packet header or payload. The attacker stays hidden from
its victim TX and RX, but is unable to manipulate the com-
munication between the victims. Without knowing the at-
tacker’s physical location, victims cannot apply conventional
defenses like null-forming2.
We do not consider eavesdropping attacks on the main
lobe of the transmission. Such an attack would affect the
communication between TX and RX, as the attacker has to
stay inside the main lobe or use a reflector, and thus can be
detected [35]. Finally, we assume the attacker has one or
more synchronized devices as powerful as the victim’s hard-
ware. The attacker knows the victim’s location and hard-
ware configuration3. The attacker and his device(s) are free
to move around the victims.
Application Scenarios. We consider three practical sce-
narios where mmWave signals are commonly used: mesh
networks [7], picocell networks [42], and indoor peer-to-
peer transmissions [8, 10]. Fig. 2 shows an illustration of
the three.
mmWave signals are commonly considered for indoor peer-
to-peer scenarios (Fig. 2(c)), e.g., virtual reality [10, 12] and
wireless display [3]. Here TX and RX are within very short
range (≤10m) and often at the same height (∼1m). As mmWave
signals degrade much faster than lower frequency signals in
the air, it is less known that they can also be used outdoor
for long-range communications (20–200m). For example,
Facebook has deployed a mesh network in downtown San
Jose [7], supporting up to 200m link using 60GHz phased
array radios4. Researchers [29, 42] also propose picocell
networks using 60GHz signals. In both scenarios, TX is
mounted higher than human height, e.g., 6m. Depending on
the scenario, RX is either mounted at a similar height or on
the ground, shown in Fig. 2(a) and (b), respectively.
Measurement Hardware. Our testbed consists of three
identical 60GHz radios. We use them as TX, RX, and the
attacker. Each radio has a 16×8 rectangular phased array
(Fig. 3) and follows the 802.11ad single-carrier standard for
60GHz communication [6]. Our radios are designed for out-
door mesh network scenario with a maximum Equivalent
2If TX knows the attacker’s location, it can change its radiation
pattern to nullify signals towards that location to avoid attacks [15].
3This information is often publicly available, or could be derived
from simple techniques, e.g., device localization.
4Compared to horn antennas, phased arrays offer robust real-time
link adaptation by eliminating mechanical steering.
Scenario
TX RX Examined
Area
(m2)
EIRP
(dBm)
Height
(m)
Distance
to TX
(m)
Height
(m)
Max
Throughput
(Gbps)
Mesh 32 6 200 6 1.0 10×20
Picocell 32 6 50 1 1.5 10×20
Peer-to-Peer 23 1 10 1 1.5 4×5
Table 1: Detailed experiment setup and configurations.
Isotropically Radiated Power (EIRP) of 32dBm, supporting
1Gbps (QPSK) transmissions at 200m range (line-of-sight).
But we could re-purpose these radios for picocell and peer-
to-peer scenarios as well, by lowering the EIRP. Each receiv-
ing radio can report received signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) of
each packet in real time.
Measurement Setup. We place our testbed radios at dif-
ferent heights and distances apart to emulate the three ap-
plication scenarios. In all scenarios, TX sends 32KB TCP
packets to RX at 1Gbps by default. Equipment placement
details and specifications are listed in Table 1. In particular
for (c) peer-to-peer, we choose 23dBm EIRP the same as the
commodity 60GHz chipset from Wilocity [9]. Given TX’s
EIRP and the distance from victim RX to TX, RX can at
best communicate with TX at 1Gbps, 1.5Gbps, and 1.5Gbps
with less than 5% packet loss in mesh, picocell, and peer-to-
peer networks, respectively. Further reducing TX power will
affect RX’s performance.
During transmission, we move the attacker radio around
TX to eavesdrop side lobes at different locations. We grid
the area around TX (200m2 for two outdoor scenarios and
20m2 for the indoor scenario) into 816 (34×24) rectangles.
In each grid, we face the attacker radio at TX and eaves-
drop the transmission for 30s. Our testbed could record 100k
packet samples and 30 SNR values in each grid. In each ap-
plication scenario, we collected a total of 80 million packets
and 24k SNR measurements.
3. EFFECTIVENESS OFEAVESDROPPING
From our collected measurements, we now present the
severity of side-lobe eavesdropping under three mmWave
network scenarios. We use the following two metrics to
quantify the effectiveness of side-lobe eavesdropping.
• Packet success rate (PSR)measures the percentage of pack-
ets the attacker could successfully retrieve from eaves-
dropping through side lobes, calculated from 100k packets
per location. When the attacker’s PSR is no less than that
of the victim RX (>95% in our experiments), we consider
it to be a full attack.
• Eavesdropping area measures the area where the attacker
can achieve PSR higher than a given threshold by eaves-
dropping on side lobe signals.
3.1 Mesh Network
We begin by showing the effectiveness of eavesdropping
in an outdoor mesh network. During transmission, the main
lobe points towards RX and side lobes point towards the
ground. The eavesdropper moves freely on the ground and
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Figure 1: Example of side lobes of
a 16×8 array (horizontal plane).
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Figure 2: Illustration of three application scenarios we test the eavesdropping at-
tack. Attacker could eavesdrop through side lobes (blue) to decode information
transmitted in the main lobe (red).
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Figure 3: Our 60GHz testbed with 16×8 antenna array.
searches for locations where he could hear side-lobe signals.
Fig. 4(a) shows the attacker’s PSR at different locations, and
how the eavesdropping area changes.
From the heatmap in the figure, we observe that the at-
tack is proved very effective. In 79m2 out of the 200m2 ex-
amined area, the attacker could successfully decode at least
one packet. Aggregated, the eavesdropping area accounts
for 39.5% of the entire area. Large connected portions allow
an attacker to act more stealthily by moving freely through
areas as large as 23m2 rather than staying in one location.
Note that all eavesdropping areas center along TX’s trans-
mission direction (along the x-axis). This allows the attacker
to easily predict vulnerable areas to launch attacks, because
side lobes along the x-axis are strong enough for eavesdrop-
ping, while other side lobes pointing away from the x-axis
suffer higher signal loss (>13dB) and become too weak.
We further investigated how the eavesdropping area changes
given different PSR thresholds. As shown in the lower figure
in Fig. 4(a), the eavesdropping area reduces very slowly as
we increase the PSR threshold. When requiring the attacker
to achieve >50% PSR, the eavesdropping area reduces only
by 19%, down to 64m2. Moreover, in a 55m2 area (69.6%
of the total eavesdropping area), the attacker could achieve
>95%PSR, the same performance achieved by RX. This fur-
ther shows the incredible effectiveness of an eavesdropping
attack in a mesh network scenario.
Our measurements for the mesh network cover 200m2
area and already show the severity of side-lobe eavesdrop-
ping. Although not shown in figure, we found that more
eavesdropping locations also exist outside the examined area,
e.g.,>20m away from TX. We leave further investigation of
these areas to future work.
3.2 Picocell Network
Fig. 4(b) shows the eavesdropping results in a picocell
network scenario. Similar to the mesh network scenario,
the attacker could successfully eavesdrop the transmission
in a large area. Within 109m2, the attacker could decode
at least one packet, which is 54.5% of the entire examined
area. An area of 54m2 within this 109m2 allows the at-
tacker to eavesdrop with >95% PSR, thus fully recovering
the victim’s transmission. The ratio of eavesdropping area to
the entire examined area is comparable to the mesh network
scenario, which indicates similar levels of effectiveness of
the eavesdropping attack.
Interestingly, in both the mesh and picocell networks, the
area of connected eavesdropping locations grows larger as
the attacker moves away from TX. This seems counter-intuitive,
since signals becomeweaker at farther distances due to prop-
agation loss. However, in outdoor scenarios, the projection
of side lobes on the ground grows larger at farther distances.
Despite the propagation loss, the side lobes remain strong
enough for the attacker to successfully decode the transmis-
sion, given the sufficiently high TX power for transmissions
at distances over 100m. This finding appears more obvi-
ous in the picocell network because TX’s beams point down-
wards, causing less propagation loss through side lobes.
Increasing link rate reduces eavesdropping area. Dif-
ferent from the mesh network, where RX remains stationary
and achieves at most 1Gbps throughput, the victim RX in
picocell is mobile. As RX moves closer to TX, RX could
achieve higher SNR and increase data rate up to 1.5Gbps,
while maintaining>95% PSR. We re-configured the testbed
to transmit at 1.5Gbps, and measured the corresponding PSR
at different locations. The lower figure in Fig. 4(b) shows
a smaller eavesdropping area when TX increases data rate
from 1Gbps to 1.5Gbps. On average, this reduces the eaves-
dropping area by 24m2. In particular, when requiring the
attacker to have >95%, increasing throughput reduces the
eavesdropping area from 54m2 to 31m2. The area reduces
because increasing the legit transmission rate also raises the
channel quality requirement at the eavesdropper, thus miti-
gating the attack to some extent. Yet it does not fully solve
the problem, as the attacker could still successfully decode
packets in a large area.
3.3 Peer-to-Peer Network
Fig. 4(c) shows the eavesdropping performance in a peer-
to-peer scenario. In a connected area of 16.6m2 the attacker
could decode at least one packet. The area is significantly
large (83%), compared to the 20m2 total examined area.
When requiring >95% PSR, the attacker could still decode
the transmission in 65% (13.1m2) of the total area.
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of side-lobe eavesdropping under three mmWave scenarios. For each scenario, the top plot shows
attacker’s packet success rate (PSR) at 1Gbps at different side-lobe locations. TX is at (0, 0) and beams towards RX
along x-axis. The bottom one shows how the eavesdropping area changes with PSR thresholds at different link rates.
Similar to the picocell scenario, both RX and TX canmove
freely, causing different distances between RX and TX. This
allows higher SNR and higher link rate without degrading
RX’s PSR, but again, it cannot remove the eavesdropping
area completely. Still, in an area of 7m2, the attacker could
decode transmissions with >95% PSR.
Note that the shape of eavesdropping area in the peer-to-
peer scenario differs from those in the other two scenarios.
This is mainly because TX sits at a much lower height than
the other two scenarios. The attacker resides on the same
plane of TX and RX, and captures the side-lobe signals on
the horizontal plane. As such, the eavesdropping area fol-
lows a similar shape of the side-lobe beam pattern (Fig. 1),
rather than the circular ones observed in mesh and picocell
networks. This observation of different shapes within eaves-
dropping areas could better guide the attacker’s predictions
for where to launch attacks based on a targeted scenario.
Although the eavesdropping area in an indoor scenario ac-
counts for a larger portion of the examined area than the
outdoor scenarios, its absolute size is significantly smaller,
thus with less potential threat. Moreover, 60GHz signals can
hardly penetrate walls, so the eavesdropping area for the in-
door scenario remains bounded by its room size, further re-
stricting the attacker’s mobility and effectiveness of eaves-
dropping. Therefore, side-lobe eavesdropping proves much
more severe in the prior two outdoor scenarios.
3.4 Summary
In all scenarios, we find that a passive attacker could ef-
fectively eavesdrop transmissions with very high PSR in a
large area. This shows that despite the directional nature of
mmWave beamforming transmission, side lobes still expose
a significant amount of information. Increasing transmission
rate slightly mitigates the threat, but cannot effectively de-
fend against the eavesdropping attack.
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Figure 5: Antenna artifacts cause side lobe distortions.
4. IMPACT OF RADIO HARDWARE
So far we have empirically measured the eavesdropping
area using off-the-shelf 60GHz devices (16×8 phased ar-
rays). In this section, we further explore whether upgrading
array hardware can help reduce the impact of eavesdropping
attacks. Specifically, there are two immediate ways to im-
prove mmWave array hardware and reduce side-lobe emis-
sions: (1) removing implementation artifacts from the an-
tenna radiation pattern, (2) increasing the number of antenna
elements. Fig. 5 compares the ideal antenna radiation pattern
and that of our current hardware. While the current hard-
ware faces distortions on side-lobe emissions, the ideal array
implementation would produce weaker, less detectable side
lobes. Similarly, increasing the number of antennas can also
reduce the emission power of side lobes [16], thereby reduc-
ing the performance of an eavesdropping attack.
In the following, we study how upgrading radio hardware
would reduce the eavesdropping effectiveness. To emulate
hardware configurations different from our testbed, we used
trace-driven simulations. Specifically, we apply the Friis
free-space propagation model [22] to compute an attacker’s
SNR at different locations. All of our testbed measurements,
along with prior works [42, 40], show that this model can
accurately estimate the SNR in line-of-sight with very small
errors (±1dB). At each location, we map simulated SNR
to PSR using the empirical correlation derived from previ-
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ous testbed experiments. We verified that this correlation
remains stable and accurate across different application sce-
narios and link rates. Our simulations follow the same con-
figuration in §2, with altered hardware aspects. We also ex-
panded the experiments by varying the height of the eaves-
dropping device and RX’s locations.
4.1 Perfect Antennas without Artifacts
First we simulated eavesdropping attacks on three applica-
tion scenarios, using perfect antennas without artifacts. Fig. 6
shows the eavesdropping areas for different scenarios, com-
pared with our testbed measurements. We only present re-
sults with 1Gbps, and omit those from other data rates as
they show similar findings.
Comparing eavesdropping areas using perfect antennas and
our testbed, we found eliminating hardware artifacts reduces
the eavesdropping area. In the mesh and picocell network
scenarios, the eavesdropping area reduced by 43% and 52%
respectively. However, the area for the indoor peer-to-peer
scenario reduced by only 4%, as for short-range indoor com-
munications, TX’s power (with 23dBm EIRP) at side lobes
is high enough to allow eavesdropping.
Despite the reduced eavesdropping area, we find the re-
maining area is still large enough for attackers to move around
while achieving high PSR. In mesh, picocell, and peer-to-
peer scenarios, an attacker could achieve full recovery of the
transmission (>95% PSR) in 45m2, 52m2, and 15m2 re-
spectively. Thus, removing hardware artifacts cannot fully
defend against eavesdropping.
4.2 Increasing Number of Antenna Elements
In addition to removing artifacts from hardware, we in-
creased the number of antennas, and tested if the combina-
tion of these two techniques could defend against the eaves-
dropping attacks. Fig. 7 shows how the eavesdropping area
(with PSR >0) changes as we increase the number of an-
tennas in the horizontal plane (our testbed uses 16 antennas
in this plane). We find that in all our application scenarios,
eavesdropping area decreases monotonically as we add more
antennas. For example, in the picocell network scenario,
using 64 antennas (compared to 16 in our testbed) effec-
tively reduces the eavesdropping area from 52.39m2 down
to 3.91m2. This confirms the theory that more antenna el-
ements reduce side lobes’ beam width and emission power,
resulting in shrinking the area where an attacker could re-
ceive the side-lobe signals.
As well as incurring larger hardware implementation cost
and size, increasing the number of antennas does not fully
prevent an eavesdropping attack. For instance, in both mesh
and picocell scenarios, a simple yet effective method for at-
tacker is to raise the eavesdropping device to get closer to TX
and receive stronger signals. This results in higher SNR than
eavesdropping on the ground, and the attacker could achieve
better eavesdropping results. Fig. 8 shows its effect in the
picocell scenario. Even though TX uses 64 perfect anten-
nas (in the horizontal plane), an attacker could increase the
eavesdropping area from 3.91m2 to 15.2m2 by moving the
device from in-hand position (1m) to above-head (2m). If
attacker uses drones to further raise the device height, the
eavesdropping area increases to 30.8m2. We observed sim-
ilar improvement in mesh networks. As such, even after re-
configuring hardware with significant cost, an attacker could
still successfully eavesdrop in large area. This poses a seri-
ous security threat as simple methods, like holding the de-
vice higher, allow attackers to advance beyond hardware up-
grades. So we need new defense mechanisms.
5. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING DEFENSES
Existing defenses focus on adding artificial noises to side-
lobe signals to prevent attackers from decoding useful infor-
mation [13, 21, 24, 31, 37, 39, 41]. They fall under two
categories, depending on how the noise is generated: (1)
antenna-based defenses and (2) RF-chain-based defenses5.
In this section, we analyze these defenses to study whether
they are practical and effective defending against side-lobe
eavesdropping. We summarize them in Table 2.
Antenna-BasedDefenses. This defense creates noisy side
lobes by changing the radiated signals from a subset of an-
tenna elements. During transmission, TX either disables [13,
37] or flips the phase [21] of a random subset of antennas.
This produces randomized radiation patterns on side lobes,
with minimal impact on normal transmissions6.
Antenna-based defenses require TX to change the selected
antenna subset very frequently, often on a per-symbol ba-
5 AnRF (radio-frequency) chain refers to a set of physical hardware
components for wireless signal processing, bridging between the
antenna array and radio baseband.
6 Due to space limit, we omit details about this defense. We refer
interested readers to related work for more information.
5
sis, i.e. at the time scale of sub-nanoseconds. Less frequent
switching keeps signals within a packet highly correlated
with each other. This could allow the attacker to simply
estimate the wireless channel, or guess the correlation con-
stant to recover the transmission. Despite the effectiveness,
switching at a per-symbol frequency incurs extremely high
cost in hardware and power. Today’s hardware can only
support packet-level switching (10s of nanoseconds) for the
same reason, making antenna-based defenses impractical.
Despite the impracticality, we implemented the defenses
in simulation. We found it effectively defends against single-
device side-lobe eavesdroppers, regardless of where the at-
tack is launched. However, it remains vulnerable to advanced
attacks. For instance, attack can use multiple synchronized
devices to measure side-lobe signals at different angles, undo
the effects of antenna randomization on a per-symbol basis,
and recover the packets. The key is to decode the antenna
selections for transmission from measurements, as there is a
limited number of antenna subset selections.
RF-Chain-Based Defenses. Unlike antenna-based de-
fenses, these defenses add additional RF chains to generate
noise and do not need randomizations in TX’s radiation pat-
tern. They “jam” the eavesdropper at TX’s side lobes, so
the attacker can only receive a mixture of transmitted signals
and noise signals. For mmWave hardware, this adds signif-
icant complexity and cost in RF signal processing compo-
nents, increasing the hardware cost and power requirements.
Despite that previous work [14, 21] reduces the hardware re-
quirement, these defenses [21, 24, 39, 41] remain costly and
power-demanding.
We found in simulations that RF-chain-based defenses ef-
fectively defend against single-device eavesdroppers. Al-
though, TX’s side lobes have gaps in between, which nulls
the transmitted signals. An advanced attacker can exploit
this and search for only noise signals. He could then perform
noise cancellation with only two synchronized receivers: one
listening to only noise and the other eavesdropping the mixed
noise and legit signals. The attack becomes more difficult
when TX uses over two RF chains to generate noise. Noise
from different RF chains would mix together and becomes
difficult to isolate. Still, this countermeasure comes at an
even higher cost in mmWave hardware and device power.
Category
Defense Requirement Vulnerability
# of RF
Chains
Antenna
Switching
Frequency
# of Sync.
Devices
to Attack
Info. Required
for Attack
No Defense 1 - 1 side-lobe signals
Antenna-Based 1 per-symbol N
signals at
N locations
RF-Chain-Based >2 - 2
noise signals
at N locations
Table 2: Summary and vulnerabilities of different de-
fense mechanisms. N is the number of TX antennas.
6. RELATED WORK
Security Analysis in mmWave Eavesdropping. Existing
works to study mmWave eavesdropping either perform sim-
ulations [13, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 37, 38, 41] or use horn anten-
nas [35], which have no side lobes. Differing from these, we
are the first to study mmWave side-lobe eavesdropping from
actual measurements, using commercial 60GHz phased ar-
rays in real-world application scenarios.
Many of these proposed defenses against mmWave eaves-
dropping, i.e. using antenna-based [13, 21, 37] or RF-chain-
based designs [21, 24, 38, 41] assume a naive single-device
attacker. Our work analyzes these proposals and finds these
methods either as vulnerable to advanced attackers with mul-
tiple synchronized devices, or they introduce significant hard-
ware overhead and cost. Thus, these defenses are not appli-
cable to mmWave transmissions.
Eavesdropping in Low-Frequency RF Bands. Eaves-
dropping is more prevalent and easier in lower frequency
bands, e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular, due to its omni-directional
signals. Many previous works propose defense mechanisms
using jamming, which injects artificial noise towards the at-
tackers [20, 27, 39]. Although different techniques are used,
e.g., a separated jammer synchronizedwith the transmitter [23],
cooperative devices or relays [20, 27], these defensive mech-
anisms all require a high number of RF chains. Despite the
acceptably minimized hardware cost in commodity Wi-Fi
and cellular devices, the cost of these defenses remains ex-
tremely high in the context of mmWave.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Despite an initial step to investigate mmWave side-lobe
eavesdropping with real measurements, we already find it
proves to be a much greater threat than we expected. We
hope our results draw the attention of the community and
shed light on the future development of mmWave communi-
cations. Moving forward, many open challenges remain.
Potential Defenses. Despite existing proposals, we lack
a practical and secure solution against side-lobe eavesdrop-
ping. Other than reducing the RF chain cost in mmWave
communications, a possible alternative could leverage the
antenna artifacts. Designing specific artifacts in hardware
could resist the attack since we saw earlier that artifacts may
alter the shape of side lobes. The artifacts should be carefully
designed so the normal transmission remains unaffected.
Empirical Validation of Advanced Attacks. We briefly
described and simulated two types of advanced attacks, i.e.
antenna randomization attack and noise cancellation attack.
While other advanced attacks remain possible, currentmmWave
hardware is not flexible enough to implement these attacks.
Also, our device does not report bit error rate (BER) which
may shed light on more fine-grained insights as [26] did. We
hope more flexible hardware becomes available soon, so we
can empirically validate the attacks with consideration of an-
tenna artifacts, which may affect the attacks’ performance.
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